End of anonymity? Why governments around the world are targeting VPNs

The story of VPNs increasingly looks less like isolated national initiatives and more like an emerging global trend. Measures that were once associated mainly with strict information control are now being introduced in countries that traditionally positioned themselves as defenders of digital freedoms. The rhetoric differs, but the direction remains the same.

A clear example is the United States. Utah has become the first jurisdiction to effectively shift responsibility for VPN usage from users to platforms. The Senate Bill 73, signed by Governor Spencer Cox, introduces a principle that until recently seemed radical: it does not matter which server a user connects through — if they are physically located in Utah, the website must treat them as a state resident. This effectively renders attempts to “hide” behind a VPN legally irrelevant.

In practice, this forces platforms into a difficult choice: either block all traffic associated with VPNs, which is technically complex and imperfect, or implement universal verification for all users without exception. Paradoxically, the second option appears more realistic. As a result, a tool originally designed as a niche privacy solution becomes a factor capable of reshaping the entire architecture of the internet — from anonymity toward full identification.

The United Kingdom is moving in a similar direction, but through a different entry point — child protection. An amendment to the Children’s Wellbeing Bill proposes restricting VPN access for individuals under 18. Formally, this is about safeguarding minors, but in practice it creates an infrastructure in which access to anonymization tools itself becomes regulated.

The context here is crucial. After the rollout of the Online Safety Act in 2025, the market reacted instantly: VPN usage surged dramatically within a single day. This clearly demonstrated that users perceive such tools as a natural way to bypass restrictions. That reaction, in turn, triggered the next regulatory step — attempting to control not content anymore, but the bypass mechanism itself.

France has not yet introduced concrete legislation, but the signal has already been given. Digital minister Anne Le Hénanff explicitly described VPNs as the “next item” on the regulatory agenda. Even with later clarifications that a full ban is not planned, the fact that the issue is being discussed at this level is significant. The topic is no longer technical — it has become political.

Looking at the broader picture, a clear pattern emerges. States with different political systems and different justifications are converging on the same model: control over access infrastructure. In some cases it is framed as child protection, in others as national security, but the outcome is consistent. VPNs are gradually shifting from privacy tools to regulated objects.

This marks an important structural shift. Previously, regulation focused on content — blocking websites, removing materials, restricting publications. Now the focus is moving one layer lower — toward the ability to conceal presence online. This fundamentally changes the rules of the game because control becomes systemic rather than targeted.

A particularly important development is the transfer of responsibility. Utah’s law establishes a model in which platforms themselves are responsible for how users interact with VPNs. This effectively forces businesses to perform functions that were once the responsibility of the state. This approach is gradually becoming universal: if a technology cannot be banned directly, its use is made economically and legally risky for intermediaries.

An additional layer is economic. Large companies can adapt by implementing verification systems, traffic filtering, and behavioral analysis tools. For them, this is an investment issue. Smaller independent platforms, however, may find these requirements unmanageable. As a result, regulation that is formally aimed at user protection begins to function as a mechanism of market consolidation.

A hidden consolidation effect emerges: only those who can afford compliance survive. Others exit the market or become dependent on large infrastructure providers. This side effect is rarely discussed openly, yet over time it may prove more significant than the original regulatory intent.

Ultimately, we are witnessing a paradox. VPNs were created as a way to restore user control over digital identity. Today, however, they are becoming the reason that this control is gradually shifting back toward governments and major platforms. The real question is no longer whether VPNs will be restricted further. The question is what kind of internet will emerge — one where anonymity remains a fundamental right, or one where it becomes an exception requiring explicit permission.